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Abstract 
The control and integration of distributed, multi-sensor per­
ceptual systems is a complex and challenging problem. The 
observations or opinions of different sensors are often dis­
parate, incomparable and are usually only partial views. 
Sensor information is inherently uncertain, and in addition 
the individual sensors may themselves be in error with re­
spect to the system as a whole. The successful operation of 
a multi-sensor system must account for this uncertainty and 
provide for the aggregation of disparate information in an 
intelligent and robust manner. 
We consider the sensors of a multi-sensor system to be 
members or agents of a team, able to offer opinions and 
bargain in group decisions. We will analyze the coordi­
nation and control of this structure using a theory of team 
decision making. We present some new analytic results on 
multi-sensor aggregation and detail a simulation which we 
use to investigate our ideas. This simulation provides a ba­
sis for the analysis of complex agent structures cooperating 
in the presence of uncertainty. The results of this study 
are discussed with reference to multi-sensor robot systems, 
distributed AI and decision making under uncertainty. 
1 Introduction 
The general problem of seeking, sensing, and using percep­
tual information is a complex and, as yet, unsolved problem. 
Complications arise due to inherent uncertainty of informa­
tion from perceptual sources,. incompleteness of information 
from partial views, and questions of deployment, coordina­
tion and fusion of multiple data sources. Yet another dimen­
sion of complexity results from organizational and compu­
tational considerations. We feel that these three topics -
information, control, and organization - are fundamental for 
understanding and constructing complex, intelligent robotics 
systems. In this paper, we are concerned with developing 
useful analytic methods for describing, analyzing and com­
paring the behavior of such constructions based on these 
criteria. 
•This material is based on work supported under a National Science 
Foundation Graduate Fellowship and by the National Science Foundation un­
der Grants DMC-8411879 and DMC-12838. Any opinions, findings, and 
conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of 
the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science 
Foundation. 
We assume from the outset that such robotic systems 
are basically task-oriented, goal-directed agents. The be­
havior of a system is determined entirely by the goal it is 
working toward, and the information it has about its envi­
ronment. At any point in time, such an agent should use the 
available information to select some feasible action. The 
most preferable action should be that which is expected to 
lead the system closest to the current goal. In short, we 
will consider the question of driving robotics systems as a 
large and complex problem in estimation and control. To 
adopt the nomenclature of decision theory[2], at any point 
in time an agent has a local informalion structure reflecting 
the state of the world, a set of feasible actions to choose 
from, and a utility which supplies a preference ordering of 
actions with respect to states of the world. We generally 
assume that a rational decision maker is one which, at any 
point in time, takes that action which maximizes his utility. 
Our commitment, as a result of casting the problem in a de­
cision theoretic perspective, is to provide principled means 
for specifying information structures, actions, and (perhaps 
most crucially) determination of utility. 
This monolithic formulation is certainly too naive and 
general to successfully attack the problem. The state of 
the system is a complex entity which must be decomposed 
and analyzed to be understood. The resulting procedures for 
control will undoubtedly be computationally complex. Com­
puter resources, like human problem solvers, have resource 
limitations which bound the complexity of problems that can 
be solved by a single agent - otherwise known as bounded 
rationality [25]. Such computational considerations suggest 
distributing the workload to increase the problem solving po­
tential of the system. From a practical standpoint, the system 
itself is composed of physically distinct devices, each with 
its own special characteristics. Software and hardware mod­
ules should be designed so that information and control local 
to subtasks is kept locally, and only information germane to 
other subtasks is made available. Ultimately, sensors and 
subtasks could independent modules which can be added or 
removed from a system without catastrophic results. In this 
case we desire each subtask to have the ability to cooper­
ate and coordinate its actions with a group while maintaining 
its own local processing intelligence, local control variables, 
and possibly some local autonomy. 
Our solution is to view the systems as decomposed 
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into several distinct decision-makers. These modules are 
to be organized and communicate in such a manner as to 
achieve the common goal of the system. Organizations of 
this type of are often referred to as teams[8,16]. We pro­
pose to consider a team theoretic formulation formulation 
of multi-sensor systems in the following sense: The agents 
are considered as members of the team, each observing the 
environment and making local decisions based on the infor­
mation available to them. A manager (executive or coor­
dinator) makes use of utility considerations to converge the 
opinions of the sensor systems. Section 2 will be devoted 
to a review of team decision theory and present some new 
analytic results[7]. 
One criticism of decision theory is that optitnal solu­
tions are often difficult or impossible to find. In order to 
aid in analysis of these problems, we have built a simula­
tion environment. We use the simulation to examine various 
non-optimal and heuristic solutions to otherwise intractable 
problems, and experiment with different loss functions to de­
termine the character of the resultant decision method. The 
simulation is a generalization of classic pursuit and eva­
sion games [141 to teams of pursuers and evaders. Each 
team member has local sensors and state variables. They 
are coordinated through a team executive. Section 3 will b e  
devoted t o  a detailed look at the simulation an d  our results 
to date. 
We feel that the team formulation of sensory systems 
has implications for the broader study of Artificial Intelli­
gence. AI is relevant to this worlc in at least two respects: 
• Firstly, it is certainly possible to consider the agents 
of the system as performing some reasoning process. 
Considering AI systems as decision-makers seems a 
plausible approach to the construction of intelligent 
distributed systems. Thus, this work has commonali­
ties with Distributed AI in that both are interested in 
questions of structuring information and communica­
tion between intelligent systems. 
• Secondly, we often want to interpret the information 
available to the system, and to communicate infor­
mation as interpretations rather than simple signals. 
This is primarily a problem in representation of infor­
mation. Again, AI has focussed on the interpretation 
of information, and the representation of that inter­
pretation. 
More generally, we would like to discover when systems like 
this can be profitably posed as decision problems. Section 4 
will be devoted to an in depth discussion of the general mer­
its and shortcomings of the organizational view, and attempt 
to define when it is most appropriate or useful. 
2 A Team-Theoretic Formulation of 
Multi-Sensor Systems 
Team theory originated from problems in game theory [26] 
and multi-person control. The basis for the analysis of coop-
eration amongst structures with different opinions or inter­
ests was formulated by Nash [20) in the well known bargain­
ing problem. Nash's solution for the two person cooperative 
game was developed into the concepts of information, group 
rationality and multi-person decisions by Savage [24]. Team 
theory has since been extensively used by economists to an­
alyze structure [16], information [18] and communication. 
Section 2.1 introduces the team structure and defines the 
function of the team members and manager. Different team 
organizations are discussed and the concepts of information 
structure, team decision, team utility and cooperation are 
defined in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 applies these techniques 
to the multi-sensor team and a method for aggregating opin­
ions is derived. Due to lack of space, we will assume some 
familiarity with probability and decision theory.1 
2.1 Team Preliminaries 
A sensor or member of a team of sensors is characterized by 
its information structure and its decision function. Consider 
a team comprising of " members or sensors each making 
observations of the state of the environment. The informa­
tion structure of the i'" team member is a function 'li which 
describes the character of the sensor observations z; E Jl; in 
terms of the state of the environment 8 E 8, and the other 
sensor actions a.; E A;. j = 1, · · ·, "· So that: 
(1) 
<:;ollectively the n-tuple 11 = ('I;,···, 'In) is called the in­
formation structure of the team. The action a; of the it" 
team member is related to its information z; by a decision 
function 5; E /); as a.; = 5;(z;). We may also allow ran­
domized rules, in which case 6 associates information with a 
distribution over the set of feasible actions. Collectively the 
n-tuple 5 = (51,···, 5n) is called the team decision func­
tion. R>r an estimation problem, the action space A; is the 
same as the spac e of possible states of nature 8: Our action 
is to choose an estimate a.; = 8; E 8. 
There are a number of different forms that the infor­
mation structure can take which in turn characterizes the 
type of problem to be solved. If for all team members 'li 
is defined only on e ('li! e - }I) the resulting structure 
is called a static team [16]. When 'li also depends on the 
other team members' actions, then the structure is called a 
dynamic team (13]. Clearly as each team member can not 
make decisions and be aware of the result simultaneously, 
the general form of information structure for a dynamic team 
must induce a causal relation on the team member actions 
a;. We can apply a precedence structure on the time instant 
a member makes a decision, so that if member i makes a 
decision prior to member j then the information structure 
IIi will not be a function of a.;. Indexing the team members 
by their decision making precedence order we can rewrite 
the information structure as: 
z; = 7J;(8, a.1 · · ·, a;-1} 
1 An extended version of this paper- appears as Grasp Lab tech. report 71. 
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A sensor or member of a team will be considered ratio­
nal if it can place a·preference ordering on its actions that 
admits a utility function u; E U. One possible set of ratio­
nality axioms can be found in [2, p. 43] and the proof that 
these axioms admit a utility function can be found in [5]. A 
decision rule 6(·) can be evaluated in terms of its payoff: 
u;(6, 8) = { u;(6(z;), 8)f(z;l8)dz; = E[u;(6(z;), 8)] 
JJI; 
We assume that a rational team member is attempting to 
maximize its payoff. 
The team utility is a function which assigns a value to 
each team action L( e, a 1, a2, · · • , an). The role of L is very 
important in characterizing the team. The interpretation of 
team action due to Ho, Chu, Marschak: and Radnor [13,16], 
is that the goal of every team member is to maximize L 
regardless of personal loss (in fact, personal loss is not even 
defined). We will call this an "altruistic" team. An alter­
native formulation is to allow .individual team members to 
have a personal utility as well as an interest in the team. 
For example a team member may agree to cooperate and be 
subject to the utility L, or to disagree with the other team 
members and be subject to a personal utility. In this case a 
rational team member will agree to cooperate only if it will 
gain by doing so: when the team utility exceeds its personal 
utility. We shall call this an "antagonistic" team. 
The idea of individual rationality can be extended to 
include so-called group rationality. Nash first introduced a 
set of group rationality axioms. There has been consider­
able disagreement about these axioms [28], and a number of 
other definitions have been suggested e.g. [10]. The under­
lying basis for providing group rationality is the ability of a 
team to put a preference ordering on group decisions. Un­
like individual utility considerations, this involves a number 
of assumptions about the nature of the group or team. For 
example, each team member must assume some subjective 
knowledge of other players rationality, interpersonal com­
parisons of utility require preferences to be congruent and 
assumptions must be made about indifference, dominance 
and dictatorship. 
2.2 Team Organizations 
The problems associated with the extension of individual 
to group rationality are all concerned with the comparison 
of individual utilities. The existence of a group preference 
ordering is equivalent to requiring that the combination of 
individual team member utilities that form the team utility, 
is convex. If this is satisfied then we say that the group 
decision is also person-by-person optimal. The key princi­
ple in group decision making is the idea of Pareto optimal 
decision rules: 
Definition: The group decision 6 • is Pareto-optimal if every 
other rule 6 E D decreases at least one team members utility. 
If the risk set of the team L(8; 61, · · · , 6n) E R.n is convex, 
then it can be shown [13] that such a team decision is also 
person-by-person optimal so that for all team members i = 
1, · · ·, n the team action a= [a1, · · ·, an]T also satisfies 
ma.x E [L (o;(z1), ···,a;= 6;(z;), · · ·, 6�(zn))] (2) a;EA; 
If the class of group decision rules D includes all jointly 
randomized rules then L will always be convex. If we re­
ally believed in an altruistic team, we must use this class 
and be subject to these results. Considerable work has been 
done on finding solutions to equation 2.3 under these con­
ditions [16,13,12,11], particularly as regards the effect of 
information structure on distributed control problems. 
We are primarily interested in teams of observers- sen­
sors making observations of the state of the environment. In 
this case the team members can be considered as Bayesian 
estimators, and the team decision is to come to a consensus 
view of the observed state of nature. The static team of esti­
mators is often called a Multi-Bayesian system [28]. These 
systems have many of the same characteristics as more gen­
eral team decision problems. Weerahandi [27] has shown 
that the set of non-randomized decision rules is not complete 
in these systems. If two team members using decision rules 
6 = [61,6:�] have utilities u(8) = u1(61,ll) and u2(62,8), 
then the team utility function L(8) = L(u(8)) will only 
admit a consensus if it satisfies the inequality: 
E[L(u(8)));::: L(E[u(8))) (3) 
This is the Jensen inequality, and it is well known that this 
will be satisfied if and only if the function L( u( ll)) and 
the risk set are convex. Generally, this will only be true 
when the set D of decision rules includes jointly randomized 
decision rules. 
Consider the team utility L as a function of the team 
member utilities so that L = L(u1, • • · , un) = L(u). The 
group rationality principles described above restrict the func­
tions L that are of interest to those that have the following 
properties[ I]: 
1. Unanimity: .!!.k. > 0 Vi lJu.; , 
2. No dictator: If 'Vi: u; =1: 0, there is no Uf such that 
L= Uj. 
3. Indifference: If Vi, 351,62 such that u;(61,·) = 
u;(62, ·),then L(61) = L(62) 
If the team utility function L satisfies these properties, we 
will say that the team is rational. The function L is often 
called an "opinion pool". Two common examples of opinion 
pools are the generalized Nash product: 
n 
L(8;61, ... ,6n)=ciTu�;(6;,8) a;;:::o 
i=l 
and the logarithmic or linear opinion pool: 
n 
L(8; 81, . . . , On)= L >..;u;(8;, e), >..; ;::: 0, 
i=l 
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The value of the generalized Nash product can be seen by 
noting that if u;(6;(Z;),8) = f(z; !8) and a; = 1 then L 
is the posterior density of 8 with respect to the observations 
z;. A criticism leveled at the generalized Nash product is 
that it assumes independence of opinions, however this may 
be accounted for through the weights a;. A criticism of 
the linear opinion pool is that there is no reinforcement of 
opinion. 
Suppose we now restrict group decision rules 6 E D 
to non-randomized decisions. This allows team members 
to disagree in the following sense: If the team risk set 
u = [u1(61,8), · · · un(6n,8)] is convex for non-randomized 
6, then equation 3 holds and a consensus may be reached. If 
however u is concave in at least one ""• and if randomized 
rules are disallowed, it is better (in terms of utility) for the 
associated team members to disagree: as if they were acting 
as an an antagonistic team. It should be clear from this ex­
ample that the difference between antagonistic and altruistic 
teams is the ability to obtain a convex "opinion" space. 
If all the U; are convex functions, then L will always be 
convex on the class of non-randomized decisions. However 
in location estimation or Multi-Bayesian systems, the u; will 
often be concave so that L(u) will be guaranteed convex 
only in the class of randomized rules. Thus L( u) will always 
be convex for an altruistic team. For an antagonistic team L 
will only be convex when agreement can be reached (in the 
class of non-randomized decisions), otherwise if opinions 
diverge sufficiently then L will be concave. Concavity will 
generally take the form of separating team members into 
convex groups of opinions coalitions which may overlap. 
Our interest in these results centers on finding when 
agreement can be reached and in calculating the value of the 
consensus. We summarize these concepts in the following: 
Result 1: Consider a team with member utilities u;(6;19) 
and team utility satisfying the group rationality conditions. 
Then: 
1.1. Consensus: Cooperation will only occur when the set 
of risk points L(611 • • • ,6n) E R.n is convex. 
1.2. Altruistic: If 6 E [) is the class of all randomized 
decision rules then L will always be convex. 
1.3. Antagonistic: If Vi, L � u; then L will be convex in 
the class of non-randomized decision rules. 
1.4. Disagreement: When L is concave there is no best 
decision and agreement cannot be reached. 
The point at which L becomes concave for each member 
is called the disagreement point, the value of a member's 
utility at this point is called the security level. 
2.3 Multi-Sensor Teams 
The fusion of sensor observations requires that we have a 
method for comparing information from disparate sources. 
We consider each sensor to be a member of an antagonistic 
team in the following sense: Each sensor comes up with un­
certain partial views !>f the state of the environment, the goal 
of the executive is to integrate the various sensor opinions , 
by offering incentives and interpretations for combining dis­
parate viewpoints. The antagonistic team structure allows 
members to disagree if for some reason they have made a 
mistake or cannot reconcile their views with those of the 
other team members. An altruistic team could not take this 
action. 
We suggest that the comparison of diverse observations 
can be interpreted in terms of a comparison of the utility of 
a consensus decision. Suppose we have two observations z1 
and z2 which are not directly comparable. Each observation 
contributes to some higher level description of the environ­
ment , and each is dependent on the other. We can interpret 
any decision 6 about the environment in terms of its utility to 
the observations: u1(6(z1)18) and u2(6(z2)18). Although 
z1 and z2 cannot be compared directly, their contributions 
to particular decisions can be evaluated in a common utility 
framework. The team theoretic comparison of utilities ad­
mits a measure of disagreement and allows for the evaluation 
of sensor information in a consistent manner. 
Define e to be the set of states of nature and consider 
a robot system with sensors 81, J = 11 •••1m, taking se­
quences Of ObservatiOnS Z; = . { zf, • • • I zn Of featureS in 
the environment. We will restrict interest to the static team 
structures so that Z; = f1;(6). Locally, sensors can make 
decisions based on local observations as 8 = 6;(z;) from 
COmparable sequenceS Z; = {zl 1 • • • I zn, With respect tO 
a common utility u;(6;(Z;)1 9). Jointly the sensor team has 
a utility L = L( 8; 611 • • • 1 6n ) , which can be considered 
as a function of the individual utilities L = L(u11 • • ·, u2) 
satisfying the group rationality conditions. 
If the observations from different sensors are incompa­
rable, they must be interpreted in some common framework. 
This will be the case when the sensors are located in differ­
ent locations for example. Let D; interpret S;'s observations 
in some common description framework. Then the team loss 
can be written as: 
L( u1(c5t[D1(z1)]1 8)1 • • • 1 u,.(o[D,. (z,.)]18)]) 
By selecting L and analyzing its convexity, we will establish 
the character of the sensor team. 
The rationality axioms derived from utility theory re­
quire that we be able to put a preference ordering on deci­
sions c5i(·). It seems reasonable that the preference ordering 
admitted by an observation Z; will be the same ordering as 
that obtained by a maximum likelihood estimator (unbiased 
Bayes rationality). In this case, the utility function of an 
observation will be coincident with its likelihood function. 
Thus the Gaussian distribution N( Zi 1 A;) associated with the 
observation z; can also be considered as the preference or­
dering or posterior utility function of z; on any resulting 
estimate 8. In this framework. two observations Z; and z1 
will have a basis for agreement only if their combined utility 
exceeds their individual utility, that is a consensus can only 
be reached if the set of observation utilities form a convex 
set. 
102 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
To fix this, define u;(z,8) = f;(ztl8) "' N(z;, A;) as 
the loss to the observation Z; of the estimate 8, and let 
denote the team utility. Then, in terms of expected utility, a 
consensus can only be reached if L satisfies Equation 3, i.e 
the function L is convex. 
The function L will be convex if and only if its matrix 
of second order derivatives is non-negative definite. If L 
satisfies the group rationality principles, this requires that 
��·; � 0 fori= 1, · · ·, n. Differentiating u; gives 
a�u· 
083' = ( 1- (6- z;)'�' A/1 (6- z;)1· N(zt,A;) 
For these to be positive, and hence the set u e R.n to be 
convex, we are must find a 8 which satisfies: 
(0- z;)'�' A/1 (8- z;) S 1 (4) 
For all i = 1, · · ·, n observations. 
Consider any two observations z; and ZJ· They can 
form a consensus if we can find a 9 that satisfies equation 
4 for both z; and ZJ. To compare observations, we interpret 
them in a common f ramework as D;(z;) and D1(z1). If 
J; and Ji are the jacobians of D; and Di respectively [6], 
define .DE;= Ji1 Ai1J;'�'. This is the information matrix 
of the observation Zt transformed to the common frame of 
reference by the transformation D. 
Since the left hand side of equation 4 is always positive, 
we must .find a 8 which satisfies 
i(8- D;(z,)?.oE, (9- D;(z;)) + 
�(0- Dj(Z)i)T.DEj (0- Dj(Zi)) s 1 {5) 
The value of 8 which makes the left hand side of this equa­
tion a minimum (and which is also the consensus when 
it exists) is given by the usual combination of normal 
observations[2]: 
8 = (.DE;+ Dr;i) -l (D!;;D;(z,·) + Dr;iDi(zi)) 
Substituting this into equation 5 gives: 
i(D;(z;)- Di(zi))'l'Dr;,(Dr;, +DEi) -1 
DEi (D;(z;)- Di(zi)) S 1 (6) 
We will say that z; and Zi admit a Bayesian (non­
randomized) consensus if and only if they satisfy equation 
6. The left side of Equation 6, which we will denote as 
d�i• is called the generalized Mahalanobis distance (a re­
stricted form of this is derived in [27]) and is a measure of 
disagreement between two observations. Figure 2.3 shows 
plots of u; against Uj for various values of a11 and which 
clearly demonstrate that the convexity of the set [u;, Uj] 
corresponds to requiring that d�i S 1. This measure can be 
further extended to consider more than two observations at a 
time. For example, if each observation z;, i = 1, · · ·, n has 
v. 
v, 
Figure 1: Plots of Mahalanobis distances 
the same variance-covariance matrix A, then a consensus be 
obtained only if: 
1 
n n 
-��d .. <l 2n2 L...J L...J 'J -i=l i=l 
(7) 
It is clear that a set of observations that satisfy Equation 6 
pair-wise will also satisfy Equation 7 
In most real situations, it is unlikely that we will know 
the variance-covariance matrices exactly. In this case, any 
estimates of the A; act as if they were thresholds in the sense 
that the larger the A; that is used, the more disagreement will 
be tolerated. 
3 Simulation Studies 
To this point, we have discussed the theoretical aspects of 
estimation in the team framework. Our goal is to even­
tually pose problems of multi-sensor control in coordina­
tion and solve them in a similar manner. However, finding 
and analyzing solutions to decision, control, or game prob­
lems, especially in the face of anything less than perfect 
information, can be extremely difficult. From a technical 
perspective, solutions under even relatively simple losses 
are complex optimization problems. Other heuristic or ad 
hoc approaches must often be considered. Methodologi­
cally, there is a question as to what proper loss functions 
are for different problems. Ideally, the loss function should 
reflect the actual state of affairs under consideration since 
it reflects the preferences of the decision maker. Whereas 
in the economics literature, losses are usually derived from 
utility considerations based on monetary rewards, we have a 
much wider set of competing criteria to consider. This com­
plicates matters to the point that we need to gain intuition 
about the issues involved before hypothesizing a solution. 
In order to deal with these issues, we have constructed 
a simulation on a Symbolics Lisp Machine . The simulation 
takes the form of a game of pursuit and evasion similar in 
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character to the classic differential game known as the ho­
mocidal cha uffeur [14}. That classical form of this game 
consists of a pursuer and evader moving at constant velocity 
in a plane. Both players have perfect information about the 
other's state, and attempt use this information to intercept 
or evade their opponent respectively. The payoff structure 
of the game is the time until capture. The major changes we 
have made are that we have equipped the players with im­
perfect sensing devices (i.e. the players use imperfect state 
information), and we allow multiple pursuers and evaders 
grouped into teams coordinated by a team executive. It is 
important to note that the motivation for using the pursuit­
evasion framework is primarily to provide each team with 
a well-defined method for comparing structures and control 
policies. The game is not of intrinsic value by itself, but 
forms a structured, flexible, closed system in which sensor 
models, organizational structures and decision methods may 
be implemented and easily evaluated 
The simulation is constructed so that we can vmy the 
structure of team members, as well as overall team structure, 
and quickly evaluate the effects of the change based on the 
character of the simulated game that ensues. We have in 
mind to allow variation in such factors as dynamics, sen­
sors, information integration policies, incentive structures, 
and uncertainty of information, and observe what types of 
policies lead to the adequate performance in these circum­
stances. We expect to transport what we learn from the 
simulation to real-world problems of multi-sensor robot sys­
tems currently being developed in the Grasp laboratory[21}. 
We imagine a situation where this simulation provides an 
environment in which distributed expert coordination and 
control problems can be investigated before implementation 
and conversely that applications of the sensor systems under 
development will suggeSl what directions, sensor models and 
dynamics would most fruitful to explore in the simulation. 
The remainder of this section details the current structure of 
the simulation environment, and outlines our initial experi­
ences with it. 
3.1 The Game Environment 
The simulation takes place on a planar field possibly littered 
with obstacles. The basic cycle execution involves team 
members taking sensor readings, executives integrating in­
formation and offering incentives, and finally team mem­
bers making decisions. The state variables are updated and 
the game moves to a new step. A game terminates when 
and if the pursuit robots;·which are equipped with a simple 
ballistics system, capture all the evaders. This is a medium 
level of granularity with emphasis on the general behavior of 
teams, not the precise performance issues of team members. 
Some time-constraint issues can be investigated by includ­
ing time parameters in the payoff functions, but computa­
tional complexity issues and investigations of asynchronous 
behavior are outside the scope of our considerations. For 
instance, if some decision policy is computationally more 
complex than another, differences in performance will not 
reflect that complexit)'. 
3.2 The Structure of Team Members 
The character of individual team members is determined by 
three modules: 
1. The kinematics and dynamics of motion on the plane, 
2. what sensors are available and the noise character­
istics of those sensors, and their kinematics and dy­
namics, and 
3. the ballistics which determine the termination of the 
game. 
The team members are constant velocity, variable di­
rection units operating in a plane with state variables z, y, 
and 8. Since the robots move with constant velocity, the 
only directly controlled variable is 8. The only dynamical 
consideration involved is how we allow the robot to change 
its current heading to some new desired heading 8 4 - the 
single control. Currently, we assume that when reorienting 
each agent can move with some fixed (possibly infinite) ve­
locity, w. The has the effect of defining a minimal turning 
radius. Pursuers generally have some finite w, while evaders 
have infinite w - i.e. they tum instantaneously. 
T he sensor model we are currently using is a range and 
direction sensor. The sensor has a limited cone of data gath­
ering, and a limited range. It has a single control variable 
a which the robot can select to point the sensor. We as­
sume that sensors typically return noisy data, so we have 
different noise models which we "wrap around" the sensor 
to make it more closely approximate real data gathering de­
vices. The induces decision problems in dealing with both 
the noise and range limitations of devices. The fact the the 
sensors are distributed introduces issues in integrating noisy 
observations from different frames of reference[6]. Finally, 
since sensors are transported by the robot, there are issues 
involved in resolving the conflicts between action for pur­
suit or evasion, and actions which will allow more efficient 
gathering of information. 
Termination of the game occurs when all evaders are 
eliminated. We define a capture region which delineates 
how close a pursuer must come to eliminate an evader. 
However, when information is noisy, the area in which the 
evader can be located will have an associated uncertainty. 
We sometimes equip each pursuer with some mechanism to 
"shoot" evaders, allowing the possibility of uncertainty in 
observation to make it "miss". Part of the payoff structure 
of the game can include costs for using projectiles and miss­
ing; thereby adding incentive to localize the evader to the 
best degree possible. 
3.3 Information Structures, Organization, and 
Control 
The intesting issues are how the robot systems are controlled, 
and how team members interact Each team member must 
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Figure 2: The Pursuit-Evasion Game 
make decisions, based on available information, about the 
best setting of its conttol variables. Thus, each team mem­
ber has a local information slrUcture and a utility function 
or decision rule as outlined in Section 2. The type of in­
formation available - its completeness and fidelity - along 
with the utility function determine how an agent behaves for 
a fixed set of conlrols. We have specifically modularized in­
formation slrUcture and decision processes so that variations 
are easily compared. 
The information slrUcture can consist of only local in­
formation, or can contain information communicated from 
other team members, as well as computed information based 
on observation history. The team executive provides the ba­
sic organizational structure of the team. It is equipped with 
the team information slrUcture, and computes the team util­
ity which is offered as the incentives for a team member to 
cooperate with the team. The issues here involve integrat­
ing the team information, and the exact nature of the team­
utility. In our experiments, we either use the executive as 
an information integrator and team blackboard, or restrict 
robots to their own local information. 
Our experiments to date have been in controlling the 
direction of !ravel of robots. Three decision methods have 
been used: 
1. Purely local information and decision 
2. Completely global information and a linear pool team 
utility (see page 3) 
3. A mix of global and local information with a non­
convex utility structure. 
The first of these is the obvious slrategy of chasin g 
whatever is within the viewing radius and avoidin g any 
obstacles. The second amounts to the executive choosing 
an evader to follow, and the team members agreeing at all 
costs. This has the undesirable property of the pursuers be­
ing destroyed while attempting purely global objectives. The 
first method disregards centralized control, possibly missing 
an opportunity for team members to cooperate for common 
benefiL The latter disregards individual concerns for global 
objectives, possibly disregarding important local objectives. 
The final method uses the executive to integrate infor­
mation about evaders, and to offer a team incentive to chase 
a particular evader. But, it also lets team members compute 
an incentive to avoid obstacles which fall on their path. Fig­
ure 2 shows a team configuration where some team members 
(those labeled "P-D") are disagreeing with the team in order 
to avoid an obstacle, while the rest of the team (labeled "P­
A") are following the executives order to chase an evader. 
This is our first experience with a mix of local and global 
control. 
Our next objective in the simulation is to consider noisy 
observations and develop sensor control algorithms. Our 
idea for this project is the following: recall that sensors 
return distance and direction. We henceforth assume both 
quantities are distributed according to some probability dis­
!ribution. The infonnation structure of the team will consist 
the current best estimate and the information matrix of mea­
surements integrated as in Section 2. The utility for an angle 
a; of a sensor i will be the expected change in the informa­
tion for the closest evader within the cone of vision. This 
means that individual memben will choose that evader for 
which they can contribute the "maximum" infonnation. We 
have not developed any team policies for this scenario, yet. 
4 Evaluation and Speculation 
We have considered a very basic, static, non-recursive team 
slrUcturc for the sensors and cues of a robot system. The 
results obtained for the aggregation of agent opinions are in­
tuitively appealing and computationally very simple. Simi­
larly, the initial simulation experiments with distributed con­
trol seem promising. However, it is clearly the case that the 
methods presented thus far could easily be developed with-
105 
out recourse to the concepts of team and information struc­
ture. We have chosen to introduce these ideas for two main 
reasons: firstly as a device through which the interactions 
between sensor agents may be easily explained, and sec­
ondly because we feel that team theoretic methodology has 
great potential for understanding and implementing more 
complex organizational sttuctures in a systematic manner. 
Our main point is that team theory is neither a completely ab­
stract non-computational formalization of the problem, nor 
a computational technique or algori!Jtm with no theoreti­
cal potential, but is in fact our analog of a computational 
theory[lS]. We assert that the inherent elements of cooper­
ation and uncertainty make team theory the appropriate tool 
for this class of problems[ll]. This section discusses the 
advantages of team theory suggests issues which need to be 
explored more fully. 
4.1 Information and Structure 
Many of the advantages of team theoretic descriptions lies 
in the ability to analyze 1he effects of different agent (team 
member) information sttuctures on the overall system capa­
bilities. Recall that in the general case, the i'" team mem­
bers information sttucture may well depend on the other 
team members actions and information, either as a prefer­
ence ordering (non-recursive) or in the form of a dialogue 
(recursive) sttucture. For example, consider a stereo cam­
era and a tactile sensor, acting together in a team. It is 
often the case that the stereo matching algorithm is inca­
pable of finding disparities and three dimensional locations 
that are horizontal in the view plane, whereas a tactile sen­
sor mounted on a gripper jaw is best at finding just such 
horizontal features. In addition it is reasonable to assume 
only to the camera agent, and the response characteristics 
of the tactile sensor are of relevant only to the tactile con­
troller. The ambient illumination as measured by the camera 
has no relevance to decision made by the tactile sensors even 
though they may cooperate in disambiguating edges. Team 
theory allows information and control to reside where it is 
appropriate, and thereby reduces problem complexity and 
increases performance potential. We believe that this is a 
crucial principle for the construction of intelligent robotics 
systems. 
To this point, we have not discussed uncertainty of in­
formation. However, information from perceptual sources 
is sure to have some associated uncertainty. Uncertainty 
adds an entire dimension to any discussion of information 
- we must consider some grade of belief in information[4] 
and how that should influence the choice of action. In the 
case of perfect sensing, information is either adequate or 
inadequate; and new information can be derived by using 
the constraints of the problem �t hand. Hence, new facts 
will either lead to more information, or be redundant. On 
the other hand, if information is uncertain, adding more un­
related observations may not really increase the available 
information. Multiple correlated observations may, in fact, 
be a better strategy since that is likely to reduce uncertainty. 
Encoding considerations such as this presents no problem 
in team theory, as information structures are perfectly ca­
pable of modeling uncertain information sources. The hard 
questions that arise are how to structure the pooling of in­
formation between sensors with dependent information, how 
to take action in the face of uncertainty, and what control 
methods are most appropriate f.or directing the gathering of 
information. We are currently exploring these issues. 
that, while a vision system is good at finding global loca- · 4.2 Loss Considerations and Control 
tions, a touch sensor is better for refining observations and 
resolving local ambiguities. What is required is a sharing The loss function associated with an agent or a team de­
of information between these two sensors: their respective termines the essential nature of the decision maker. In the 
information structures should be made dependent on each standard optimal control formulation, specification of infor­
other's actions. We can imagine specifying the problem so mation structures and loss provide the criteria for selection 
that the solution is anything from a simple optimal control to of the optimal conlrol law or deci.sion rule. However, op­
an extended dialogue taking place between the two sensors, timal rules are often difficult to derive, and have a compu­
resolving each others observations and actions, arriving at tationally complex nature. General results are known only 
a consensus decision about the environment. This example for a restricted class of information structure/loss function 
clearly shows the advantages of a team theoretic analysis. formulations. Another method for selecting controls is to 
We can postulate alternative information structures for the postulate as class of admissible conlrols, and choose the 
sensors and the dynamics of the exchange of opinions can member of this class which minimizes the loss. Lastly, we 
be analyzed: Is a consensus obtained? When is a decision can consider constructing decision rules ad hoc and eval­
made? Should communication bandwidth be increased or • · uating their performance relative to an objective based on 
decreased? etc. simulation studies. In any case, the character of the loss 
Another aspect of this scenario is that the two sensors function is crucial in determining the resultant decision rule 
have partitioned the environment into a kind of "who knows or control law. 
what" information structure. In general, not all the informa- One area which needs more exploration is a methodol­
tion about a robotics system is relevant to the construction ogy for the specification of loss functions. Ideally, the loss 
of specific portions of the system. Analogously, all the in- function should be justifiable in terms of objective criteria 
formation available via sensors is not relevant to the perfor- related to the problem. Pragmatically, it is often dictated by 
mance of all parts of the system. In the example above, the mathematical convenience. From the team perspective, more 
spatial characteristics of the camera image are of interest work needs to be done on the interaction of team and local 
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loss characterizations. Section 2 presented some results in 
this direction, but more work is surely needed, particularly 
in the case where the team objectives are not expressible as 
some combination of member's objectives. 
To illustrate what we have in mind, consider formulat­
ing loss functions for controlling a system based on a desired 
state of information. That is, if the team has its goal some 
state of information (for example, to move an arm this in­
formation is needed), what action is most appropriate for 
progressing from the current information state toward the 
desired information state. Should it select an action which 
will change the uncertainty associated with current infor­
mation, or go ahead with an action that adds uncorrelated 
evidence? How should it decide that it has enough infor­
mation? More concretely, should the executive take another 
picture with the camera, or perhaps take a different view, 
or maybe use another sensor altogether. Maybe the sensors 
themselves should decide individually what to do. These 
are all issues dealing with the interaction of information and 
action. By using team theory, we can easily formulate the 
problem, specify loss functions or decision methods based 
on, for example, the parameters of a probability distribution 
associated with some information source, and examine the 
results via simulation or by analytic methods. 
4.3 Decision Theory and AI 
As we stated at the outset, we consider our work relevant to 
AI in that we that we may want to consider information as 
interpreted, and would like to consider parts of a system as 
intelligent reasoning agents. In related work dealing with the 
interaction of intelligent agents, Rosenschein and Genesereth 
in [22] and Ginsburg in [9] have investigated variations on 
game theoretical definitions of rationality for coordinating 
intelligent agents. However these results are an attempt to 
analyze the interaction of intelligent agents with no a priori 
structure and investigate the consequence of various ratio­
nality assumptions. We, on the other hand, postulate a given 
team structure and are interested in discovering its proper­
ties. This is an important fundamental distinction to keep in 
mind. 
It is our view that knowledge-based reasoning agents 
can be used effectively in the team theoretic framework; 
but, we must be able to describe them in terms of the other 
systems elements - that is, as decision makers with infor­
mation structures and preferences about action. In order to 
achieve this objective, we must develop information struc­
tures to be compatible with AI conceptions of information 
as discrete (usually logical) tokens, and so�ehow connect 
control structures and loss formulations. At his point, we 
can sketch at least possibility. First, view such reasoning 
agents as consisting of two phases: computing the informa­
tion structure, and selecting an optimal action in the face of 
available information. This is similar to the classic separa­
tion of estimation in control in control theory literature[3]. 
Computation of the information structure amounts to using 
furnished information and making implicit information ex-
plicit relative to a given model[23].  That is, some part of 
the information in the knowledge base is used to infer new 
facts from given information. The complete set of such facts 
form (in a limiting sense) the information structure. Some 
of the theoretical analyses of (logical) knowledge have de­
tailed methods for describing this process of inference using 
variants of modal logic[23]. 
Loss formulations for the preference of actions can be 
specified using a conception of action similar to the situation 
calculus[17,19]. In this system, action is a mapping between 
world states, where each state represents a configuration of 
the world. Moore [ 19] has shown how both information and 
action can be represented and related within the conceptual 
framework of world states, making loss formulations based 
on information possible. The actual details of this procedure 
are beyond the scope of this paper, but we can show that 
several problems in the planning domain can, in fact, be 
reduced to decision problems posed in this manner. As a 
further example, consider building a decision-maker who 
attempts to fill in gaps in an incomplete, discrete knowledge 
base. The specification of information and loss functions can 
be done in terms of world states as presented above, and the 
actual implementation of the system done as a rule-based 
system. 
Finally, we may attempt to combine this agent with 
agents which attempt to reduce uncertainty in the probabilis­
tic sense outlined in the previous subsection. For instance, 
a camera and a tactile sensor which have local probabilistic 
uncertainty reduction methods, and a global executive which 
is building models of the environment. Using team theory, 
we can analyze possible methods for control and cooperation 
of these disparate agents and offer a coherent explanation of 
the full system's  behavior. 
5 Conclusions and Future Research 
Analysis of the general team organization with respect to 
team members information structures provides a systematic 
framework for addressing a number of important questions 
concerning the effect of sensor agent capabilities on over­
all system performance. We summarize some of the more 
important issues: 
1. Could sensor benefit by guidance from another team 
member. Should communication between members 
be increased. 
2. Should the sensors ability to make observations be 
enhanced in anyway, by changing hardware or finding 
algorithmic bottlenecks. 
3. When would an exchange of opinions and dynamic 
consensus be attempted. 
4. What overall system structure (as described by the 
information structures of the team members) is best 
(or better) for different tasks. 
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Similarly, there are a number of important questions that 
can be addressed by analyzing the effect of individual team 
members utility and decision functions, including: 
1 .  Communication and time costs in the decision process 
to provide for real time action. 
2. Inclusion of decisions to take new observations of 
the environment if previous opinions are rejected by 
other team members, or if insufficient information 
was obtained on a first pass. 
3. Effects of new decision heuristics on overall system 
performance. 
Of course all these ideas may well be difficult to consider 
analytically, though this formalism does reduce the search 
space of alternatives and provides a framework within which 
these issues may be evaluated. The team theoretic organiza­
tion is a powerful method for analyzing multi-agent systems, 
but it is certainly not the complete answer. 
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